8 results for "Rafael Graebin Vogelmann"
Showing 1–8 · 0.26 seconds · RSS
-
Journal Article Full text
WHY DO WE NEED THE NOTION OF WILL?
ABSTRACT It is commonly held that the goals at which an action aims are specified by the pro-attitude/belief pairs in light of which the action seems appealing to the agent. I argue that the existence of multiple-incentives cases (i.e., cases in which the agent has more than one incentive to act…
-
Journal Article
Acting in light of the facts: an ecological approach
We conceive of ourselves as capable of acting in response to normative reasons. Given that normative reasons are facts, this self-conception entails that we are capable of acting in response to facts. Arguments from error cases might seem to force us to deflate this self-conception, for they seem…
-
Journal Article
Representation and Phenomenalism in the Critique of Pure Reason
Kant has often been accused of being a phenomenalist, i.e., of reducing spatial objects to representations that exist only in our minds. I argue against this reading. Given Kant’s claim that appearances are mere representations, the only way to avoid the accusation of phenomenalism is to provide an…
-
Journal Article
Sentimentalist normative constructivism
I articulate a new constructivist approach to the problem of the normativity of moral demands that provides a middle ground between Kantian and Humean constructivism. This approach combines a modest form of normative constructivism with neo-sentimentalism about virtues. I hold that it can plausibly…
-
Journal Article
SOBRE SEGUIR REGRAS E O DEVER DE REFLEXÃO PERPÉTUA
O principal objetivo deste texto é argumentar em prol da alegação de McDowell de que temos uma obrigação perpétua de refletir sobre o ajuste entre nossa visão de mundo e a realidade. Esta obrigação está atrelada à recusa da possibilidade do que ele chama de uma “visão lateral” da realidade. O…
-
Journal Article
Resposta a “Argumentos de superveniência contra o realismo moral robusto” de Wilson Mendonça
Em seu “Argumentos de superveniência contra o realismo moral robusto”, Wilson Mendonça defende o realismo moral robusto (a tese de que propriedades morais não são idênticas a propriedades naturais) do Argumento Explanatório a partir da Superveniência. Segundo esse argumento, o realismo robusto é…
-
Journal Article
Squeezing the good into the right
Some of our reasons for acting are grounded precisely on the fact that we are not fully virtuous agents. This shows that the intuitive view that what we should do is what a virtuous person would do in the circumstances we find ourselves is false. Many take this to show that there is not a close…
-
Journal Article
Robust ethical realism, necessary truths and the miracle of morality
Non-naturalists about the normative face the problem of providing a metaphysical explanation for the supervenience of the normative on the natural. Recently, Gideon Rosen has argued that non-naturalists can side-step this problem by rejecting strong supervenience and the view that normative truths…