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Journal of Mechanism and Institution Design
ISSN 2399-844X · Society for the Promotion of Mechanism and Institution Design · 50 artikel di indeks
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A position assignment experiment among active duty United States Navy physicians
The United States Navy (USN) assigns personnel to jobs via assignments officers; placement guidance exists but the process is decentralized. Participant attitudes towards and limited experience with market design are possible impediments to its incorporation into the assignment process. We…
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On the influence of network structure on the resilience and losses of financial systems
We investigate resilience to defaults in financial networks, where nodes hold shares in a common set of external assets. Price fluctuations in these assets can trigger shareholder defaults, propagating through the network and causing default cascades. In particular, we conduct a series of numerical…
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Polynomially tractable cases in the popular roommates problem
The input of the popular roommates problem consists of a graph G = (V, E) and for each vertex v in V, strict preferences over the neighbors of v. Matching M is more popular than M' if the number of vertices preferring M to M' is larger than the number of vertices preferring M' to M. A matching M is…
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Equilibrium conditions for Catch-22 situations
This paper examines whether Catch-22 situations persist as equilibrium phenomena based on Gatekeepers' preferences rather than arbitrary rules. We model a game-theoretic scenario inspired by Heller's paradox, featuring a Requester (either Sane or Insane) who signals before a Gatekeeper decides to…
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Mediated (anti)persuasive communication
Can private information or mediation change a sender's behavior and improve the receiver's expected utility in persuasive communication games? In a mediated Bayesian persuasion model, private information cannot improve the receiver's expected utility when the sender communicates it. When the…
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The Existence of Equilibrium Flows
In this paper, we establish conditions for the existence of an equilibrium in the equilibrium flow problem studied by Galichon et al. (2024). The problem nests several classical economic models such as bipartite matching models, hedonic pricing models, shortest-path and minimum-cost flow problems…
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Bayesian Bullshit
A bullshitter neither knows nor cares about the truth, and therefore, it has been asserted, is more pernicious than a liar. We examine this assertion within the standard model of cheap talk communication where a bullshitter is modeled as an uninformed Sender. We show that in some circumstances…
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Respect for Improvements and Comparative Statics in Matching Markets
One of the oldest results in the theory of two-sided matching is the entry comparative static, which shows that under the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance algorithm, adding a new agent to one side of the market makes all the agents on the other side weakly better off. Here, we give a new proof of…
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An Efficient and General Ascending Menu Auction under Budget Constraints
An auctioneer wishes to sell multiple heterogeneous indivisible items to several bidders. Every bidder can demand several items, have complex preferences and faces a hard budget constraint. In this setting, Walrasian equilibria may fail to exist. We propose an ascending menu auction that always…
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Kenneth Arrow's Last Theorem
In Kenneth Arrow's last week of life at age 95, he reported that "I began my research career with an impossibility theorem. If I had time now, my last theorem would be an impossibility theorem about social choice for environmental policy." This paper completes the formalization, proof, and…
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Stable and envy-free lottery allocations for affordable housing
Affordable housing lotteries often enforce a rule preventing duplicate lottery entries that makes the model in Hylland and Zeckhauser (1979) (HZ) inapplicable. We revisit HZ and propose a new individually stable (IS) allocation that can be achieved by a Tickets algorithm and accommodate the rule. A…
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Reducing incentive constraints in bidimensional screening
This paper studies screening problems with quasilinear preferences, where agents' private information is two-dimensional and the allocation instrument is one-dimensional. We define a preorder to compare types based on their marginal valuation to the instrument, which facilitates the reduction of…
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Optimal mechanism design with approximate incentive compatibility and many players
We consider a setting in which a mechanism designer must choose the appropriate social alternative depending on the state of nature. We study the problem of optimal design and demonstrate that a mechanism which allocates resources so as to achieve the social optimum and assigns payments equal to…
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A market design solution to a multi-category housing allocation problem
We study multi-category housing allocation problems: A finite set of objects, which is sorted into categories of equal size, has to be allocated to a finite set of individuals, such that everyone obtains exactly one object from each category. We show that, in the large class of category-wise…
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Golden rule in cooperative commons
This paper considers common use of natural, renewable resources. It identifies good prospects for efficiency and welfare. To be precise, a core outcome -- hence cooperation -- can be secured over time by principal planning of total quotas, and in time by agents who share these in short-term…
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Centralized clearing mechanisms: A programming approach
We consider financial networks where agents are linked to each other by financial contracts. A centralized clearing mechanism collects the initial endowments, the liabilities and the division rules of the agents and determines the payments to be made. A division rule specifies how the assets of the…
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Characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms revisited
We reexamine the characterization of incentive compatible single-parameter mechanisms introduced in Archer and Tardos (2001). We argue that the claimed uniqueness result, called 'Myerson's Lemma' was not well established. We provide an elementary proof of uniqueness that unifies the presentation…
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A regulatory arbitrage game: Off-balance-sheet leverage and financial fragility
This study examines a simple banking system in a game-theoretic framework wherein banks act as self-interested agents to maximize leverage at the expense of overall financial stability. The resultant strategic inefficiency raises concerns about how banks manage the "financial stability" good, which…
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Object-based unawareness: Theory and applications
In this paper and its companion paper, Board and Chung (2021), we provide foundations for a model of unawareness that can be used to distinguish between what an agent is unaware of and what she simply does not know. At an informal level, this distinction plays a key role in a number of recent…